'restrictive measures against natural and legal persons'. Yet the CJEU held in the case of Rosneft that the jurisdiction of the CJEU under Article 275(2) TFEU should be interpreted not only to cover the specific measures against individualised persons, but also measures of general application to the extent that they prohibit everyone to economically support or interact with the individualised persons on the list. The Court did not extend its jurisdiction under Article 275(2) TFEU to cover measures of general application unrelated to the list of targeted individuals, such as embargoes and trade restrictions on categories of products.
11
This may be reasonable because of their close connection with individualised measures and because of their potential high impact on rights; yet, this distinction also results in a fragmentation of jurisdiction over parts of a CFSP decision. 12 Sanctions have been the subject of an exceptionally large number of rulings, both of the General Court and the CJEU on this matter. At the time of writing (June 2017), one hundred and eighty-one cases before the ECJ on restrictive measures have been decided, 13 ninety-four of which have been successful.
14 Sixty-four additional cases are pending before the GC. 15 Ten appeals were brought to the ECJ in 2013 and 2014 only. Two appeal cases were decided in April 2016. 16 This overview does not count cases that only relate or refer to restrictive measures.
However until the case of Rosneft in 2017 these rulings all reviewed the TFEU regulations rather than the CFSP decision. The Court agrees in settled case law to review the 11 Rosneft op. cit. supra note 1, paras 94-107, with the conclusion in para 107. See chapter 4. 12 the TFEU regulations are in relevant parts prescribed by the underlying CFSP decisions, rulings on most aspects of the procedural and substantive legality of the regulation -even if they do not directly address the legality of the CFSP measure -will also carry great persuasive weight with regard to the legality of the CFSP decision.
2.4) The Actual Decision Takes Place Outside of the EU Legal Order
Three types of EU sanctions can be distinguished: Firstly, EU sanctions giving effect to UN Security Council resolutions that impose sanctions, i.e the sanctions at stake in the Kadi case, implementing Security Council Resolution 1267; secondly, supplementary measures that are adopted by the EU and that are related to but go beyond UN sanctions, i.e. 
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Where EU sanctions are adopted to give effect to UN Security Council Resolutions, the EU in principle faithfully follows all changes made to UN sanctions. 19 If the UN Security
Council Sanctions Committee adds a name, the Commission adds the name. If the UN Sanctions Committee deletes a name, the Commission deletes that name. 20 The UN Sanctions Committee lists persons and entities based on a statement of case submitted by a UN member state. 21 It remains the choice of that state what information is made public.
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The information is routinely considered too sensitive to share even with the UN Sanctions
Committee. Thus, often the Sanctions Committee does not actually have information to 17 Ibid., paras 105-6 on the close link between the CFSP decision and the TFEU regulation. 18 Thomas Biersteker and Clara Portela, "EU sanctions in context: three types", (2015 41 The Court did so specifically for the reputational damage resulting from the public sanctions measures.
However, while the Court stated at the outset that the Council regulation adopted under the TFEU is a direct consequence of the adoption of a CFSP decision under the TEU it did not consider this fact in the context of non-material damages. While this case confirms that an unlawful listing in a TFEU regulation may lead to compensation it does not immediately allow the conclusion that the Court would accept jurisdiction for a stand-alone CFSP listing.
Logically, the CFSP listing caused the reputational damage. It is the first public listing of the applicant's name and is only copied into the regulation. 
3.2) Institutional Consequences: Closed Evidence
Sanctions have in the past regularly been annulled because the Council was unable to substantiate the reasons for listing. This speaks to the need for a closed-evidence procedure.
Article 105 The General Court's new rules of procedure do not specifically refer to sanctions or to CFSP. Hence, information related to the CFSP is treated as any other confidential information. The difficulties of being unable to share confidential information in sanctions cases hence triggered the creation of a general closed evidence procedure, which now allows also for more judicial secrecy in other areas. This could ultimately lead to a spillover of secret judicial proceedings to other, non CFSP areas. This would be most likely for asylum or criminal law, e.g in cases with a national security dimension.
3.3) Implications under National Law
In some Member States an explicit national rule attaches additional consequences to an EU sanctions listing. National law may for example exclude accepting refugees who are members or supporters of any of the groups listed under the EU sanctions regime. In a preliminary reference from a German court, the Court of Justice was asked to rule on this consequence of EU sanctions under national asylum law. 46 A German asylum authority had decided that membership of an organization included on the terrorist lists justified excluding the person from refugee status. The CJEU held that exclusion from refugee status must be decided on a case-by-case basis, but also stated that inclusion on an EU sanctions list is a Yet, secondary sanctions can also result in a challenge of the underlying EU listing. In 2017 the CJEU ruled in a preliminary reference concerning secondary sanctions 60 that the listing of an organization could be challenged in a preliminary ruling request in the context of national proceedings against secondary sanctions imposed on natural persons for having supported that organization, including after the period for bringing an action for annulment against that listing in the EU Courts had expired.
3.4) EU Counter-Terrorist sanctions as Part of EU Counter-Terrorist
Autonomous EU counter-terrorist sanctions are not only a particular type of sanctions but also a particular type of EU counter-terrorist policies. This raises the question of how 
4) Tension between legal rules and political objectives
The intrinsic tension between legal rules and procedures and political objectives could not be more apparent. This somewhat counter-intuitively may result in a situation where it is more difficult for the Council to defend the measure with more limited fundamental rights consequences (targeted sanctions) in court than the measure with more far-reaching fundamental rights consequences (trade embargoes).
4.1) Re-Listing
In practice, the EU institutions have been able to maintain the sanctions, despite the repeated annulments by the EU Courts. The Council regularly re-listed natural and legal persons after the EU Courts had annulled their listing. This may be justified and reasonable if the procedural flaws of the listing decision can be remedied in the re-listing decision.
However, it is at least prima facie less justified if the reason for annulment was that the reasons for listing could not be substantiated and that the reasons for listing are only reformulated in the re-listing decision. The Council is not obliged to demonstrate that the re- 
4.2) General policy objectives and specific fundamental rights restrictions
The political objectives, including the symbolic or signalling functions of sanctions regimes cannot be easily explained without raising difficult fundamental questions of justice. decisions essentially concerns a familiar weighing of the common good and the rights of individuals it is difficult to justify them in a Kantian ethical framework using individuals as means to serve a more general purpose. However, a combination of different purposes for a rights-sensitive measure is widely accepted, including for criminal punishment. Hence, part of the motivation to punish can be the protection of the population, including from other perpetrators who are discouraged from breaching the law because they fear the example of those punished. Yet, any punishment finds its limits in the severity of the criminal act, the damage and the subjective responsibility of the perpetrator. This is where the difficulties within the context of sanctions begin. The limits of subjective responsibility are in general terms guaranteed by the proportionality principle. Yet the proportionality principle is not able to ensure these limits in the context of sanctions because of the way it is interpreted in this context. 80 The tension between the general purpose and the individual rights restriction may also be one of the reasons why the EU does not identify the objectives more clearly and make an argument how any specific objective is served by targeting a particular person.
4.3) Change in Behaviour
The hence be seen as an extension of the powers of the Council.
The objectives that targeted sanctions regimes pursue have equally multiplied.
Besides internal conflicts, nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, democratisation and protection of civilians, including their human rights, have become objectives of sanctions imposed by both the UN and the EU. The EU sanctions against Russia are an example of a sanctions regime that is characterized by a great diversity of objectives and measures. They were introduced in March 2014. 86 In the first year, not only the list of persons and entities but also listing criteria were amended every month. 87 The following range of prohibited actions and protected objectives gives a good impression of increasing diversification of objectives and measures: protection of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine; the misappropriation of public goods; a ban on imports of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol unless they have Ukrainian certificates; a prohibition to invest in Crimea; 88 a ban on providing tourism services in Crimea or Sevastopol; 89 goods and technology for the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors or the exploration of oil, gas and mineral resources may not be exported to Crimean companies or for use in Crimea; technical assistance, brokering, construction or engineering services related to infrastructure in the same sectors must not be provided. 
5.3) Ever vaguer listing criteria
While the sanctions criteria of counter-terrorist sanctions have always been very broad and arguably rather vague, e.g. requiring an association with an alleged terrorist organization, the sanctioning criteria used in regime sanctions have equally become broader and vaguer over time. An example is the sanctions regime against Iran, which has been fundamentally adapted to make the sanctions more likely to stand in Court. They started with a focus on individuals who contribute to the proliferation of nuclear materials and changed to supporting generally those governing Iran. Two appeal cases before the CJEU specifically examined the criterion of 'support to the Government of Iran' set out in Article associated with them, as listed in the annex to that decision. 101 The following section will inter alia discuss how broadly this particular listing criterion is interpreted. 
5.4) Trends in Litigation
The could not put forward any evidence, however could arguably be seen to have caused the most reputational damage. By confirming that substantiating one of the reasons for listing is sufficient to make the listing lawful, the ECJ effectively opens the door to a practice of giving a combination of more specific and more general reasons, which damage the listed person's reputation to different degrees, without ever having to put forward any evidence for most and potentially the gravest of these reasons.
6) Conclusion and Recommendations
EU sanctions targeted at specific individuals, be it sanctions against terrorist suspects or regime supporters, have replaced comprehensive state sanctions. At the same time, the combination of ever vaguer listing criteria and the fact that the ECJ accepts sets of indicia as sufficient to justify a listing also reduces the targeted nature of sanctions and allows them to targed categories of people. What seems fairly certain is that for the moment sanctions are here to stay.
However, the EU sanctions policy continues raise fundamental rights concerns. Some of these concerns could be addressed by taking Declaration 25 on Articles 75 and 215 TFEU, as it was attached to the Lisbon Treaty, more seriously. This Declaration reads as follows:
The Conference recalls that the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms implies, in particular, that proper attention is given to the protection and observance of the due process rights of the individuals or entities concerned. For this purpose and in order to guarantee a thorough judicial review of decisions subjecting an individual or entity to restrictive measures, such decisions must be based on clear and distinct criteria. These criteria should be tailored to the specifics of each restrictive measure.'
This does not seem to leave room for a combination of a presumption of association of a regime in the broadest sense possible because someone is an economically active person under this regime, or even a family member of such an economically active person. 114 Ibid., 59.
The requirements of tailoring the sanctions criteria to the specific regime should be translated into a requirement that they are directly linked to the objectives of that regime.
Since The tension between the policy goals and the specific restriction of the rights of individualised persons may also be the reason why the EU Courts have constructed a level of judicial review which leads to fewer annulments and ultimately to less litigation being brought against EU sanctions. Indeed, the combination of the presumptions based on inferences that place the burden of proof effectively on those to whom the presumption applies, the broader and vaguer listing criteria, and the acceptance of a test of proportionality that weighs any individual rights infringement against the overpowering objective of international peace and security, have made sanctions litigation less successful.
It has simply lowered the threshold of justification.
The consequence that sanctions have for the legal culture, as well as for trust and confidence in the legal system, must be considered. These costs go beyond the infringement now, the adoption of a legal framework pursuant to the rules and standards of the ordinary legislative procedure is necessary to avoid the impression of arbitrary exercise of executive power.
